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ADmiNismTnrsvE LAw-JUDicIAL REVmw OF ORDER OF POSTMASTER GENERAL.-
Acting under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, the Postmaster General
ordered the plaintiff's publication excluded from the mails. From an in-
terlocutory order granting a temporary injunction commanding the defendant,
postmaster at New York, to transmit the plaintiff's publication, an appeal was
taken. Held, that the order granting the preliminary injunction was erroneous.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917, C. C. A. 2nd) 246 Fed. 24.
The complainant filed its bill in equity to enjoin the postmaster from acting
under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, to withdraw its mailing privilege.
Held, that the complainant was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. .ef-
fersonian Publishing Co. v. West (1917, D. C. Ga.) 245 Fed. 585.
See COMMENTS, p. 550.
AGENcY-VoID PowER OF ATTORNEY-LEASE EXECUTED THEREUNDER NOT SUB-
JECT TO REFORmIATION.-A statute provided that powers of attorney to make
leases for a term of more than three years must be properly acknowledged
and recorded. The plaintiff in error appointed an agent to have general super-
vision of the premises in question, but such authority was not acknowledged.
Subsequently, the agent executed a lease to the defendant in error for a period
of five years, the lease reading that the lessee would surrender possession on
one year's notice. On refusal to quit after proper notice, action to oust was
commenced, whereupon the defendant in error instituted proceedings to have
the lease reformed, claiming that a clause had been omitted which would have
made the lease terminable only after the happening of a specified event. Held,
that since the agent's power of attorney was not acknowledged, the lease was
void and could not be reformed. Lithograph Bldg. Co. v. Watt (1917, Oh.) 117
N. E. 25.
A power of attorney ordinarily need not be acknowledged. Moore v. Pendle-
ton (1861) 16 Ind. 481; Tyrrell v. O'Connor (1897, Ct Err.) 56 N. J. Eq. 448, 41
Atl. 674. But, if required by statute, acknowledgment is a condition precedent to
the validity of the agent's acts. Oatman v. Fowler (1871) 43 Vt. 462. See also
I Mechem, Agency, 166; 1 R. C. L. 258. In such cases the factual element of
authority is present, for the principal has given the agent what he believed to
be sufficient authority; but, because of the effect of the statute, the expected
legal relations are not created, and the intended agent does not acquire the
"legal power" to convey. Where there is no "power" because of non-compli-
ance with the statute, equity will not take cognizance of the agent's acts with
a view to reformation; for there must first be a valid agreement. Gebb v. Rose
(1874) 4o Md. 387; Hedges v. Dixon County (1893) 150 U. S. 182, 192, 14 Sup.
Ct 71. See also 34 Cyc. 915. Consequently, since the invalidity could not be
remedied, the addition of the omitted words would be vain. An instrument
inoperative as such because of the agent's lack of power may be given the effect
of a contract to make such an instrument, if such contract would have been
within the agent's powers. Heinlen v. Martin (1879) 53 Cal. 321; Lobdell v.
Mason (894) 71 Miss. 937, I5- So. 44; see also I Mechem, Agency, 162. In the
principal case, power to make any such contract was lacking.
ALIEN ENEMIES-RIGHT TO SuE-FRENcH CORPORATION wITH GERMAN STOCK-
HOLDERS SUING IN FRANcE.-A mining company incorporated and managed in
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France, operating in the Barbary States, Africa, was managed by a board of
four directors, of whom only one was German. Eight-tenths of the stock, how-
ever, was owned by German subjects resident in Germany. The company was
engaged in selling the products of its mines in Germany. The company brought
an action in France. Held, that the large stock ownership by Germans was
evidence of German control, and precluded the maintenance of the action. Mines
de Barbary v. Reymond (Court of Paris, July 7, x916) reported in (1917) 44
CLunTr, 226.
In this case, the French courts had to deal with the same problem which was
presented to the English Court of Appeal in the case of Daimler v. Continental
Tyre Co. (0. A.) [1915] I K. B. 893, and to a New York court in Fritz
Schultz Jr. Co. v. Raimes (1917, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 166 N. Y. Supp. 567. See
COmMENT in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, io8. It was stated as a dictum in
the English case that to determine enemy character the court might go behind
the English incorporation and ascertain the actual enemy control of the cor-
poration, in spite of the rule of English law that the nationality of c6rporations
is governed by the place of incorporation. According to a uniform line of
decisions in France, the nationality of corporations is governed by the law of
the place of its center of administration (siege social). Nevertheless, super-
imposing upon this rule of "private law" (sic) a new rule of public law, a
legislative decree of Sept 27, 1914, had provided that the actual control of cor-
porations by alien enemies was sufficient to permit the sequestration of their
property. In the English case the control of the corporation's business was.
deemed to be in the Board of Directors, toward which the court looked rather
than to the stockholders, as was done in the principal case in France. The Eng-
lish view was the one accepted by the New York Supreme Court in Fritz
Schultz, Jr. Co. v. Raize,s, supra.
BILS AND NoTEs-DiscEHARE OF Co-MAKER SURETY UNDER N. I. L.-
SURRENDER OF COLLATERAL BY PAYEE.-The plaintiff, payee of a promissory
note, sued the defendants whose names appeared as makers but whom he
knew to have signed as sureties. The sureties defended on the ground that
the plaintiff, without their knowledge or consent, had surrendered to the prin-
cipal debtor collateral securities. The plaintiff claimed that under the Negotiable
Instruments Law this was no defense. Held, that the sureties were discharged.
Southern Nat. Life Realty Corp. v. People's Bank (1917, Ky.) 198 S. W. 543.
According to the law merchant the surrender of collateral security by the
creditor, or other conduct prejudicially altering the surety's position without his
consent, operated to release the surety wholly or pro tanto from liability. Guild
v. Butler (1879) 127 Mass. 386; Elsey v. People's Bank (1915) 166 Ky. 386,
179 S. W. 392. Has the Negotiable Instrument Law changed this equitable
rule? This problem has had a checkered career in the courts of Kentucky.
It was first held, without reference to the statute, that the old law merchant
rule obtained. Elsey v. People's Bank, supra. But on petition for rehearing,
the court's attention being drawn to section 119, N. I. L., the former opinion was
withdrawn and the surety was held liable. Elsey v. Peoples Bank (i9x6) 168
Ky. 701, 182 S. W. 873. Finally, in the principal case, the court has overruled
the latter decision and, frankly admitting that certain sections of the Act were
not then considered, has restored the rule that the surety is discharged. The
reasoning upon which this conclusion is reached is as follows: In the hands
of the payee the note was merely "issued," not "negotiated" (sections i9o, 3o,
N. I. L.), hence the payee was not a "holder in due course" (section 52), and
the note was subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable (section
58). When the question arises between the immediate parties to the instrument,
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if it be conceded that the payee is not a holder in due course, the court's conclu-
sion seems necessarily to follow. In accord but not cited in the opinion is Ful-
lerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer (i9o8) 139 Ia. 176, 117 N. W. 50 (extension of
time to principal). When, however, the instrument is in the hands of a holder
in due course, the statute would appear to cut off the surety's defense. Section
29 declares that a surety whose name appears as maker is primarily liable, irre-
spective of the knowledge of the holder for value; while the provisions of
section 119 as to discharging the instrument may well be deemed to be exclusive,
and section i2o to refer only to parties secondarily liable. Such has been the
holding in a number of cases which have adjudged the surety liable-without
referring to section 58. TVanderford v. Farmer's Nat. Bank (19o7) io5 Md. 164,
66 At. 47, 1o L. R. A. (N. S.) 129 (extension of time) ; Richards v. Market Exch.
Bank (91o) 81 Oh. St. 348, go N. E. OO0, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99 (extension of
time); State Bank v. Jeltz (1917, Kan.) 167 Pac. 1O67.
BILLS AND NOTEs-NEGoTIABILTY-REFERENCE IN NOTE TO EX'nuNslc AGREE-
MENT-After an unconditional promise to pay in a note, there was added,
'Value received. Rent for month of August, 1915, for . . . , as per contract
dated March 24, 1913." On suit brought by a transferee of the note, defendant
claimed that this provision made the note non-negotiable and subject to defenses
which existed between the defendant and the original holder. Held, that the
words "as per contract" qualified the promise to pay, and made it subject to
the conditions of the contract referred to, and the note was therefore non-
negotiable. Provosty, J., dissenting. Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Times
Publishing Co. (1917, La.) 76 So. 612.
An instrument, to be negotiable, must be payable unconditionally and at all
events. N. I. L., see. I (2). Accordingly it has been held that if a note refers
to another writing, so that, on its face, it makes the duty of payment expressly
subject to the conditions contained in the other writing, this deprives the note
of its status as a negotiable instrument. Titlow v. Hubbard (1878) 63 Ind. 6;
Kendall v. Selby (19o2) 66 Neb. 6o, 92 N. W. 178; Hull v. Angus (191I) 6o
Oreg. 95, 118 Pac. 24 But a promise or order may be unconditional, though
coupled with a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument.
N. I. L., sec. 3 (2). So a reference in an instrument to another agreement does
not render it non-negotiable unless it is clearly indicated that the instrument
is to be governed by conditions contained in the extrinsic agreement referred
to. National Bank of Newbury v. Wentworth (1914) 218 Mass. 30, 105 N. E.
626; 3 R. C. L. 918. And it has been held in many cases that a provision such
as that in the principal case is not sufficient to indicate an incorporation of such
conditions. Taylor v. Curry (1871) log Mass. 36, 12 Am. Rep. 661; Bank of
Sherman v. Apperson (i88o, C. C. W. D. Tenn.) 4 Fed. 25; National Bank of
Newbury v. Wentworth, supra. The majority of the court in the principal, case
apparently considered that the words "as per contract" must be read as if
directly following the promise to pay and qualifying that promise. Under this
interpretation, the decision would be easily supportable. The dissenting judge,
however, adopted what seems the sounder view, that these words, in view of
their place in the instrument, should be construed as modifying and defining
the word "rent," and thus as merely forming a part of the recital of the trans-
action which gave rise to the notes, identifying the particular rent for which the
notes were given.
CARRIERs-TERxmiNATIoN OF RELATION OF CARRIER AND PASSENGER-OPPORTU-
NITY TO ALIGHT.-The plaintiff was a passenger on one of the defendant's street
cars, and, because of a ditch on the sidewalk side of the car, was let down by
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the defendant in daylight on the highway side, in accordance with a custom
known to the plaintiff. Before the plaintiff had taken many, if any, steps, she
was struck by an automobile coming in the opposite direction at negligent speed
on the wrong side of the road. A statute required automobiles to slow down
or stop when approaching a street car discharging passengers. The defendant
requested a .nonsuit on the ground that the relation of passenger and carrier ter-
minated upon the plaintiff's alighting from the car. The court submitted the ques-
tion of the defendant's negligence to the jury, who found for the plaintiff. Held,
that the ruling of the court was correct. Walker and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
Woods v. North Carolina P. S. Co. (1917, N. C.) 94 SL E. 469.
The duty of a carrier to exercise the highest degree of care continues only
while the relation of passenger and carrier exists, and it is the generally accepted
view that one who has alighted from a street car and is in safety upon the
highway is no longer a passenger, but a traveler upon the highway. Powers v.
Connecticut Co. (igo9) 82 Conn. 665, 74 Atl. 931; Street R. R. v. Boddy (igoo)
1o5 Tenn. 666, 58 S. W. 646. There is some ambiguity in the term "in safety,"
but generally a passenger must obtain at least a safe footing and is entitled to
be landed in a reasonably safe place. McDonald v. St. Louis Transit Co. (19o4)
io8 Mo. App. 374, 83 S. W. iooi. The carrier is under a duty to warn its
passengers of any dangers or defects in the street of which it has knowledge, when
not obvious to the passenger. Murnahan 'v. Cincinnati, etc., St. Ry. Co. (1905) 27
Ky. L. Rep. 737, 86 S, W. 688. But the general rule is that where the passenger
has as good an pportunity as the company's servants to observe the conditions
which confront him in attempting to alight, there is no such duty on the part
of the company. Indianapolis Co. v. Pressell (i9o6) 39 Ind. App. 472, 77 N. E.
357; Thompson v. Gardner, etc., Ry. Co. (19o6) 193 Mass. 133, 78 N. E. 854.
The weight of authority is therefore with the dissent in the principal case. The
age, sex, and condition of the passenger should of course affect the degree of
care required of the carrier, but no evidence of any special disability appeared
in the principal case, and it seems asking too much to require a street car
conductor to look ahead for approaching automobiles before each passenger
alights. Especially is it unreasonable to require the company or its servants to
anticipate such a combination of reckless speed, disregard of the rules of the
road, and violation of statute, by an independent wrongdoer, as resulted in the
accident in question.
CONsTITuTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGIsLATIvE POwER-CommIssION FORM
OF CITy GoVmNMENT VALm.-Under the Optional City Government Law (N. Y.
Laws 1914, ch. 444) the majority of the voters of the city of Watertown voted
to adopt a commission form of government A taxpayer's action was brought
to restrain the city and its officers from organizing under the act on the ground
that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the voters
of the city. Held, that the act was constitutional. Cleveland v. City of Water-
town (1917, N. Y.) 58 N. Y. L. J. 8i (Jan. 8, 1918).
The trial court and the Appellate Division, two judges dissenting, had held
the statute unconstitutional as involving a delegation of legislative power.
Cleveland v. City of Watertown (917, App. Div.) 166 N. Y. Supp. 286. In
reversing this decision the Court of Appeals adopts the usual line of reasoning,
arguing that "the act is complete in itself," but is to take effect only upon the
happening of a certain event, viz., the approval of a majority of the voters of
the locality. In this it follows earlier New York cases involving analogous
statutes, and the view prevailing almost universally. The opinion attempts with
slight success to distinguish the case from Barto v. Himrod (1853) 8 N. Y. 483,
which held invalid a state-wide statute which was to take effect as a law only
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when approved by a majority vote of the electors of the state. As the court
says, the doctrine of that case "has not since been applied unless the facts
brought the case strictly within it." The plain truth is that legislative power
in respect to local affairs is habitually delegated to local governing bodies,
although we disguise this fact by calling the resulting local laws ordinances. No
sound constitutional reason appears to exist why the voters of a city might not
be authorized by legislative enactment-as they are by express constitutional
provision in some states-not merely to adopt a complete charter framed for
them by the legislature but even to frame the charter for themselves. So far
as state-wide laws are concerned, the view taken in Barto v. Himrod, supra, has
been followed in a few states. Santo v. State (1855) 2 Iowa, 165; State v.
Hayes (i881) 61 N. H. 264; Ex parte Wall (1874) 48 Cal. 279, 23 L. R. A. 113,
note; State v. Garver (x9o2) 66 Oh. St. 555, 64 N. E. 573. It has however been
rejected by other states. State v. Parker (1854) 26 Vt. 357; State ex rel. Van
Alstyne v. Frear (g1o) i42 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961. A most illuminating
argument against the doctrine of Barto v. Himrod is found in Mr. Justice
Holmes's dissent in Opinion of the Justices (1894) i6o Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488.
There seems to be no answer to his contention that in the absence of some
limitation the state legislature has the whole of the law-making power, which
would therefore include the power to provide that a given law shall not go into
effect if rejected by the voters. As there is no express limitation upon the
power of the legislature to so enact, if such limitation exists it must be implied.
For such an implication there seems to be no real basis, unless the courts are
to read their own notions of government into the constitution as implied limita-
tions. It is to be hoped that in the future the narrow and illiberal view of the
power of the legislature taken in Barto v. Himrod, supra, and the other cases
cited, will come to be recognized as unsound and will ultimately be overruled.
It is needless to point out that in many states the adoption of constitutional
provisions providing for the state-wide referendum have already settled the
question in favor of the more liberal view of the powers of the legislature.
CONTRACTs-ACcEPTANcE-SUFFICIENCY OF AcTS TO CONSTITUTE AccEPTANCE
AS MATTER OF LAw-The defendant was put in possession of a piano on thirty
days' trial under a promise either to sign a contract to pay in monthly install-
ments if he decided to keep the piano, or to return the piano if not satisfied. He
kept the piano for several months, but gave notice of dissatisfaction on one or
two occasions. Suit was brought for the full purchase price. Held, that as a
matter of law the defendant's acts constituted an acceptance of the piano, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Stevens, J., dissenting. Evans Piano
Co. v. Tully (I917, Miss.) 76 So. 833.
It is submitted that the court confused a breach of the terms of a preliminary
contract of bailment with an acceptance of the offer to make a contract of sale.
No contract of sale was completed in this case for the reason that the offer
to sell was never accepted. The power to accept conferred upon the offeree
could be exercised only by executing a written document. This power never
was exercised and the offeror knew that it was not. See (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOuRNAL 272; Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Jones (1917, Miss.) 75 So. 55o. The
defendant had, however, promised for a valuable consideration either to sign the
written contract of sale at the end of the trial period or to return the piano.
Failure to do either would be a breach of this contract. Choice v. Mosely
(1828, S. C.) i Bailey, 136; see also Hunt v. Wyman (I868) ioo Mass. 198,
and cf. Isaacs v. MacDonald (1913) 214 Mass. 487, 1O2 N. E. 81. In an action
of assumpsit for such breach the plaintiff would be entitled to adequate damages,
amounting, in case of the destruction of the piano, to its full value. Drake v.
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White (1875) 117 Mass. io; cf. Sun, etc., Ass'n v. Moore (igoi) I83 U. S. 642, 22
Sup. Ct. 24o. In the principal case, however, there had been neither destruction
nor loss, nor even demand and refusal (which would of course have given an
action for conversion), and it would seem that the plaintiff's only right of
action was for breach of the bailment contract. To get all the damages to
which this breach would entitle him, the plaintiff should first have demanded the
piano, and after obtaining it, could have recovered its rental value from the
end of the trial period, together with any extra expense involved in securing its
return. The actual decision not only makes a contract of sale for the parties,
where there was none, but a contract differing substantially in terms of pay-
ment from the plaintiff's offer. It is supported, however, by a very similar
decision in Wheeler v. Klaholt (igoi) 178 Mass. IWI, 59 N. E. 756.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE OF AN UNENFORCEABLE
PRomIsE.-In the case of an overdue debt, the creditor and the debtor made a
new bilateral agreemefit, the debtor promising to pay in certain installments and
the icreditor promising to forbear suit. The creditor forbore as agreed and now
sues on the debtor's promise to pay in installments. Held, that although the
bilateral contract was invalid for lack of consideration, the actual forbearance
by the creditor completed a valid unilateral contract upon which action lies.
Hay v. Fortier (1917, Me.) io2 Atl. 294. See COMMENTS, p. 535.
CONTRACTS-CONTRACTS To DEvsE OR BEQUEATH-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-
The plaintiff deeded certain property to his aunt upon her agreement to make
a will amply providing for him. Later both the plaintiff and his aunt made
mutual wills, each making the other sole beneficiary. Still later she altered her
will to his detriment, and died. Held, that a valid, irrevocable contract was
made which would be enforced by fastening a trust upon the estate of the
deceased. Lawrence v. Prosser (1917, N. J. Ch.) 1ot At. io4o.
The plaintiff's father agreed to and did give up to A and A's wife his parental
rights as father of the plaintiff, and they agreed that the plaintiff should have
all their property upon the death of the survivor of them. Later A's wife died
and A married again and died, leaving his second wife and their child, the
defendants. Before his death A had delivered a deed in escrow by which he
gave all his property to the defendants, who had no knowledge until after A's
death of A's contract with the plaintiff's father. Held, that the agreement was
not enforceable against the wife and child because its enforcement would be
inequitable; also, that an amendment which alleged that A and his first wife
had executed a joint will, unrevoked during her lifetime, in favor of the plain-
tiff 'was properly disallcowed where there was no allegation that such joint will
was made pursuant to a contract with the first wife or was intended to be
irrevocable. Sargent v. Corey (917, Cal. App.) i66 Pac. IO21.
See COMMENTS, p. 542.
CONTRACTS-TESTAMENTARY CONTRACTs-VALiDrr.-A partner entered into
an agreement with his copartners that certain promissory notes should be
given them to be renewed from year to year and paid after his death. Held,
that the agreement was not testamentary and was not revoked by a later will,
but was enforcible. In re Eisenlohr's Estate (1917, Pa.) m02 At. 117.
A contract was made between partners that in the event of the death of one
the other should have the business and should pay the heirs of the deceased a
stipulated sum. Held, that the agreement was testamentary and unenforcible,
since not executed as a will. Ferrara v. Russo (1917, IL I) I02 Atl. 86.
See COMMENTS, p. 542.
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CoNTRAcTs-THmI PARTY BENEFICIARY-SUIT BY DoNEE-BENEFicIARY.-A hus-
band promised his wife on her death bed that in consideration of her executing
a certain will he would himself bequeath a certain amount to a favorite niece
of the wife. The niece sued the executor of the husband for breach of the
above promise. Held, that the contract was valid and that the beneficiary could
maintain an action upon it. Seaver v. Ransom (1917, App. Div.) 58 N. Y. L. J.
1211 (January 15, 1918).
It has long been held in New York that a beneficiary who is a creditor of
the promisee can maintain an action on the promise of a third party to pay the
debt due. Lawrence v. Fox (i859) 2o N. Y. 268. For a long period, the New
York courts refused to extend this rule to the case of a beneficiary who was
not a creditor but was a mere donee. The performance of the promise had to
be "a satisfaction of some legal or equitable duty" owing by the promisee to
the beneficiary. Durnherr v. Rau (1892) 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49; Vrooman
v. Turner (1877) 69 N. Y. 28o. This requirement has been more and more
liberally construed, until now it seems probable that any donee-beneficiary will
soon be allowed to enforce the contract. A relationship by blood or marriage
between the promisee and the beneficiary is held to supply a sufficient "equitable
duty" and to create an enforceable right in the beneficiary. Bouton v. Welch
(19o2) 17o N. Y. 554, 63 N. E. 539; Buchanan v. Tilden (1899) 158 N. Y. log,
52 N. E. 724; Todd v. Weber (1884) 95 N. Y. 181. The principal case extends
this rule to cover the relationship of aunt and niece. See contra, Everdell v.
Hill (igoi, N. Y.) 58 App. Div. 151, 68 N. Y. Supp. 716. In several cases it
has been held that the relation between a municipality and one of its citizens is
sufficient to enable the latter to sue on a contract made with the municipality
for the benefit of the citizens. Pond v. New Rochelle W. Co. (i9o6) 183 N. Y.
330, 76 N. E. 211; Smyth v. New York (1911) 203 N. Y. 1o6, 96 N. E. 409;
Rigney v. New York Central R. R. Co. (1916) I61 App. Div. 187, 217 N. Y. 31,
146 N. Y. Supp. 395, iii N. E. 226. The principal case is in accord with the
rule prevailing in most of the states, and it is submitted that the decision need
not have been made to depend upon the existence of some shadowy moral duty
resting on the promisee in favor of the beneficiary.
EASEMENTS-LIGHT AND Am-ImPuIn GRANT IN LEASE FOR YEARs.-A land-
lord leased a building to a tenant for years, with a covenant for quiet enjoy-
ment. Thereafter the landlord was about to erect on adjoining land, which he
owned and had owned at the time of the lease, a structure that would cut off
the light and air from the tenant's windows. The tenant sought an injunction.
Held, that there was no implied easement of light and air in the lease to the
tenant. Anderson v. Bloomheart (1917,, Kan.) 168 Pac. 9Ol.
In England easements of light and air may be acquired by prescription, even
though this violates the general rule that the adverse user on which prescrip-
tion is founded must be such as to give the other party a right of action. Cross
v. Lewis (1824) 2 B. & C. 686; Acts 2 and 3 Win. IV, c. 71, sec. 3; Aynsley v.
Glover (1875) L. R. io Ch. 283. This is said to be due to the cramped condi-
tions in England, leading to a desire to sa- e all open space left. For like reasons
the English courts have implied a grant of an easement of light and air, where
the owner of two adjoining parcels, with a building on one of them overlooking
the other, has leased or sold the parcel on which the building was situated.
Broomfield v. Williams (C. A.) [1897] 1 Ch. 6o2 (sale); Coutts v. Gorham
(1829, N. P.) M. & M. 396 (lease); Warner v. McBryde (1877, Ch. D.) 36 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 360 (lease) ; but see Birmingham, etc., Banking Co. v. Ross (1888,
C. A.) 38 Ch. D. 295. In this country the same reason for allowing such
easements has not existed, and the general policy of our law has been opposed
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to unnecessary servitudes which would restrict the beneficial use and develop-
ment of land in growing communities. The courts have therefore generally
refused to allow easements of light and air by prescription. Haverstick v. Sipe
(1859) 33 Pa. 368; Stein v. Hauck (1877) 56 Ind. 65, 26 Am. Rep. io. Nor will
they imply such an easement in connection with a sale except in cases of real
and obvious necessity. Keats v. Hugo (1874) 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. 8o;
Rennyson's Appeal (188o) 94 Pa. 147, 39 Am. Rep. 777. Where the question
arises under a lease, opinion is divided, with perhaps a slight weight of
authority in favor of allowing the easement Case v. Minot (1893) 158 Mass. 577,
33 N. E. 700, 22 L. R. A. 536; Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co. (1907) 129
Ga. 62, 58 S. E. 631, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 333; contra, Keating v. Springer (1893)
146 Ill. 481, 34 N. E. 8o5, 22 L. R. A. 544. In such cases the argument from a
general policy of free development has less weight because of the temporary
character of the right if allowed; but it is perhaps a close question whether, in
a country where easements of light and air are so much the exception rather
than the rule, an intention to grant such an easement should readily be inferred.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND FOR Wi''s ToRTs-EmcT OF
MAMum WOMEN'S PROPERTY Acs.--The plaintiff sued the defendants, husband
and wife, on account of personal injuries caused by the defective condition of
a garage owned by the wife. The plaintiff was employed by the wife as a
chauffeur. A married women's property act was in force. Held, that the defend-
ant husband was not liable. Cole v. De Trafford (1917, K. B.) 1I7 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 224.
In an action for alienating the affections of the plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff
contended that the defendant was liable for his wife's tort although he had
had no active participation in it A married women's property act was in force.
Held, that the husband was not liable. Claxton v. Pool (1917, Mo.) i97
S. W. 349.
By the common law the husband was jointly liable with his wife for tots
committed by her, subject to the exception that where the tort was not a tort
simpliciter, but the, substantial basis of the wrong done the plaintiff was an
alleged contract made by the wife (invalid, of course, as a contract) no liability
could be imposed upon the husband. Liverpool, etc., Ass'n v. Fairhurst (1854)
9 Ex. 42o; Wolff & Co. v. Lozier (19o2, Sup. Ct) 68 N. J. L. 103, 52 Atl. 303.
It is submitted that the true reason for the husband's liability was the necessity
of joining him "for conformity" because the wife could not be sued alone. Capel
v. Powell (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. 743; Cuneod v. Leslie (C. A.) [19o9] I K. B.
88o, 887; cf. Henley v. Wilson (19o2) 137 Cal. 273, 70 Pac. 21. Consequently
it would seem that legislation permitting a married woman to sue and be sued
as a feme sole and to own separate property might well be held to abolish the
husband's common law liability See Schuler v. Henry (1908) 42 Colo. 367, 94
Pac. 36o. In England, however, it has been decided that his liability remains
unaltered by the Married Women's Property Act. Earle v. Kingscote (C. A.)
[1900] 2 Ch. 585; but cf. remarks of Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Cuneod v.
Leslie, supra, p. 888. And the principal English case above reported is decided,
not upon the effect of the emancipating legislation (except so far as that made
possible the wife's separate ownership of the garage), but upon the theory that
the plaintiff's cause of action-arose out of his contract of employment, the
invitation to enter the garage arising therefrom and being essential to his cause
of action. Hence the case was thought to fall within the exception to the
husband's common law liab.ility. In America there is much diversity of opinion
as to how far emancipating legislation has abrogated the old rule. See Schuler
v. Henry, supra. By the weight of authority the husband is not liable for torts
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arising out of the condition or management of the wife's separate property.
Boutell v. Shellaberger (1915) 264 Mo. 7o, 174 S. W. 384; Quilty v. Battie
(1892) 135 N. Y. 2oi, 32 N. E. 47; cf. Missio v. Williams (1914) 129 Tenn. 504,
167 S. W. 473. But as to pure torts not connected with the wife's separate
property, the husband is usually still held liable. Poling v. Pickens (1911) 70
W. Va. 117, 73 S. E. 251, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 995. The principal Missouri case
above reported repudiates this distinction and ranges Missouri with the few
states which have held the common law rule entirely abolished by emancipating
legislation. It overrules earlier Missouri cases cited in the opinion. The rule
laid down by the decision is, for the future, expressly established by a recent
statute. Mo. Laws 1915, 269.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPuTD NEGLIGENCE-JOINT ENTERIP sEis The plaintiff, a travel-
ling salesman, desired to cover certain territory. Another salesman of his
acquaintance intended to travel over the same territory in his own automobile,
driving the car himself. It was arranged that the plaintiff should travel with
him, sharing the xpense. Through the negligence of the owner in driving, the
automobile was struck by the defendant's train. The plaintiff was injured, and
sought to recover. Held, that the plaintiff was barred by the driver's negligence,
since they were engaged in a joint enterprise. Derrick v. Salt Lake Ry. Co.
(1917, Utah) I68 Pac. 335.
The doctrine of imputed negligence, as formerly applied to driver and pas-
senger, is now generally rejected, the principle being limited to cases involving
some element of agency, including those of master and servant, and of joint
enterprise. Denver C. T. Co. v. Armstrong (1912) 21 Colo. App. 64o, 123 Pac.
136; Ward v. Meeds (1911) 114 Minn. i8, 13o N. W. 2. See also L. R. A.
1917 A, 543 and note. Whether or not an undertaking is a joint enterprise is
a question of fact, and the courts are not in accord upon the definition. Ward
v. Meeds, supra; Judge v. Wallen (1915) 98 Neb. 154, 152 N. W. 318, L. R. A.
1915 E, 436. Generally, it is considered as one in which each participant has
authority to act for the other in respect to the control of the means used to
execute the common purpose, and an equal right to direct the conduct of the
undertaking. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bell (1916, Okla.) 159 Pac. 336; Koplitz
v. St. Paul (19o2) 86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794. Thus, where two men hired a
horse and buggy and jointly bore the expense, it was considered a common
enterprise. Christopherson v. Minneapolis Ry. Co. (1914) 28 N. D. 128, 147
N. W. 791. Also, where two men were engaged in moving furniture. Schron
v.Staten LR.R. Co. (1897, N. Y.) 16 App. Div. 111, 45 N. Y. Supp. i24; Cass v.
Third Ave. Ry. Co. (1897, N. Y.) 2o App. Div. 591, 47 N. Y. Supp. 356. But
it has been held that a common purpose of riding for pleasure does not alone
establish a joint enterprise. Lawrence v. Sioux City (igi5) 172 Iowa 320, 154
N. W. 494; Chicago, P. & St. L. R. v. Condon (i9o5) 121 Ill. App. 44o. Though
the principal case is supported by Judge v. Wallen, supra, it would appear from
ordinary experience that where one of the participants is the owner of the car,
there is a tacit understanding that the vehicle is under his sole control, thus
removing the essential requisite of a joint enterprise. Such a situation is mani-
festly different from one in which the parties jointly hire another's vehicle.
An agreement to share expense would furnish some evidence on the question
of joint control, but would seem not to be decisive. For this reason, the decision
in the principal case seems open to question.
PRACTICE-JuRY-CHALLENGE To ARRAY AFTER CHALLENGE TO PoLLS.-The
defendant in a civil action assisted in the selection of the panel of jurymen for
the term. The plaintiff, with knowledge of this fact, examined the talesmen
YALE LAW JOURNAL
called on the voir dire, and after making five challenges to the polls, challenged
the array. The trial judge overruled the challenge to the array on the ground
that no actual harm to the plaintiff was shown. Held, that the challenge to the
array thus made should have been upheld. Vermont Box Co. v. Hanks (1917,
Vt.) io2 At. 91.
The panel may be quashed when any of the members have been summoned
at the instance of either party to the action. Co. Lift. 156 a; Peak v. State
(1888, Sup. Ct) 5o N. J. L. 179, 12 At. 701. Or when prejudice of the summon-
ing or selecting officer is shown. People v. Felker (1886) 6i Mich. 114, 28 N. W.
83. Or when the panel is not summoned or selected in the manner required by
statute. See People v. Borgstrom (19o4) 178 N. Y. 254, 7o N. E. 78o. Actual
harm need not be shown. Peak v. State, supra. The proper method of attacking
the panel is by a challenge to the array. Borrelli v. People (1897) 164 Ill. 549,
45 N. E. io24. But it is well settled that a prior challenge to the polls is a
waiver of any absolute right to challenge the array. Forsythe v. State (1833)
6 Oh. ig; Mueller v. Rebhan (1879) 94 Ill. 142; State v. Taylor (i896) 134
Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92. And the courts have held strictly to this rule where
the challenge to the array was based on a deviation from the statutory regula-
tions for selecting or summoning the panel, being averse to overthrowing a
decision because of a mere irregularity. Page v. Inhabitants (1843, Mass.) 7
Metc. 326; State v. Clark (1894) 121 Mo. 500, 26 S. W. 562; and see Bergman
v. Hendrickson (igoo) io6 Wis. 434, 82 N. W. 3o4. But the trial court may in
its discretion allow a' challenge to the array, after a challenge to the poll.
Thompson, Trials (2d ed.) sec. ii3; Cox v. People (i88o) 8o N. Y. 5oo. And
the intervention of a party in interest in the selection of the panel furnishes good
reason for relaxing the strict rule. See McDonald v. Shaw (700, Sup. Ct)
i N. J. L. 6; cf. People v. Felker, supra. The principal case held, in conformity
with these principles, that once the trial court had decided in its discretion to
consider the belated challenge to the array, the facts of the case" should have
caused it to sustain the challenge.
PRINcPAL AND Su TY-DEFENsEs OF SuRETy-FRA~u uPoN PJUNcrPAL.-The
plaintiff secured by fraud a stay bond from the defendant in a former action.
On default by the principal he sued the surety on the bond, who sought to set
up as a defense the fraud practiced upon the principal. Held, that the surety
could not avail himself of such a defense before the principal had elected to
avoid the contract, since the principal had the option to affirm the contract and
sue for damages for the fraud. Ettlinger v. National Surety Co. (1917, N. Y.)
117 N. E. 945.
Failure of consideration in the contract between the creditor and the principal is a
good defense by the surety. Sawyer v. Chambers (1864, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 43 Barb.
622; Gunnis v. Weigley (i886) 114 Pa. 1gI, 6 Atl. 465. If a surety contracts
in ignorance of duress practiced upon the principal, he may plead this as a
defense, since it materially increases his risk. Patterson v. Gibson (1888) 8I
Ga. 8o2, 1o S. E. 9; Osborn v. Robbins (1867) 36 N. Y. 365. On similar
grounds, if the contract of the principal is secured by fraud, the surety should not
be bound. Putnam v. Schuyler (875, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 4 Hun 166; Bryant v. Crosby
(1853) 36 Me. 562. If denied this defense the surety is of course entitled to
indemnity from the principal, who must then look to the creditor in an action
for the fraud. This involves a quite needless circuity of action. The court in
the principal case declares that the surety cannot be allowed the defense without
holding also that it would bar any further action by the principal. But this seems
an unnecessary dilemma. Besides the injury to the principal, the fraud was a
distinct injury to the surety, since dt substantially increased the risk that he
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would be called upon to pay. He should be released on this single ground, leav-
ing creditor and principal to work out their rights between themselves just as
if there had been no surety.
RErovAL OF CAusEs-SUIT BROUGHT IN COURT OF STATE OF WHICH NEITHER
PARTY WAS AN INHABITANT.-A citizen of one state sued a citizen of another
state in a state court of a third state. Held, that the defendant might remove
the cause to the federal court for the district within which the suit was pending.
M. Hohenberg & Co. v. Mobile Liners, Inc. (1917, S. D. Ala.) 245 Fed. i69.
An alien sued a citizen of Pennsylvania in a state court of Ohio. Held, that
the defendant might remove the cause to the federal court for the district of
Ohio within which the suit was pending. Keating v. Pennsylvania Co. (i917,
N. D. Oh.) 245 Fed. 155.
An assignee of an alien sued a citizen of New Jersey in a state court of New
York. Held, that the defendant could not remove the cause to the federal
court for the District of New Jersey. Ostron v. Edison (1917, D. N. J.) 244
Fed. 228.
The existing confusion on this general subject has arisen from the decision in
Ex pare Wisner (1905) 203 U. S. 449, 27 Sup. Ct I5. A provision of the
federal Judiciary Act of 1887, as amended in 1888 (substantially re-enacted in
sec. 5i of the Judicial Code of 1911), forbade the bringing of any civil suit in a
federal district court in any district other than that of which the defendant
was an inhabitant, except that where jurisdiction was founded solely on diversity
of citizenship, the suit might be brought in the district of residence of either
plaintiff or defendant It was held in the Wisner case that this limitation
applied also to removal, and that a suit between citizens of different states
could not be removed to a court in which it could not originally have been
brought Though modified in one respect by In re Moore (1907) 209 U. S. 490,
28 Sup. Ct 585, and though its soundness has been doubted by lower federal
courts, the Wisner case has never been overruled. The Hohenberg case supra
is directly in conflict with that decision, which is not noticed in the opinion, and
no other authorities are cited. Section 29 of the Judicial Code, dealing with
the procedure on removal, provides expressly and exclusively for removal to the
federal court for the district in which the suit is pending. From this section,
and the decision in the Wisner case, it apparently results that when a citizen
of one state sues a citizen of another in a state court of a third state, the suit
cannot be removed at all. There is, however, some authority for disregarding
the limitation apparently imposed by section 29, and allowing the defendant
to remove to the federal court in the district in which he resides. See
authorities on both sides collected in Eddy v. Chicago & N. W. Ry Co. (1915,
W. D. Wis.) 226 Fed. i2o, 126.
Where suit is brought in a state court by an alien against a citizen in a state
of which the latter is not an inhabitant, a similar conflict has arisen, both on
the question of removal to the federal court in the district where the suit is
pending, and, on the question of removal to the district of the defendant's
residence. Authorities on the former question are collected in the Keating case,
supra, and on the latter in the Ostrom case, supra. On the one hand some courts
have assumed that the rule of the Wisner case should be extended to suits to
which an alien is a party, and that since under section 51 an alien is not en-
titled to sue a citizen in the federal court of any district except that where the
defendant resides, such a suit cannot be removed to the federal court of any
other district. It then seems to follow from the provisions of section 29 that
when the suit is brought in a court of a state where the defendant does not
reside it is not removable at all. This was the practical result of the decision in
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the Ostrom case, since, under the previous decisions of the District Court for
the Southern District of New York, the case was not removable to that court.
The view taken in the Keating case, however, is that the language of section 51
is wholly inapplicable to a case where an alien is a defendant, that an alien may
be sued by a citizen in the federal court of any district where he may be found,
and that if section 51 would not prevent his being sued. by a citizen in the
federal court of a given district, it will not prevent his being brought into the
same court by the removal of a suit which be has first instituted in the state
court. That an- alien may be sued in the federal courts in whatever district
he may be found was settled by In re Hohorst (1893) i5o U. S. 653, 14 Sup. Ct.
221, and Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane (1898) 170 U. S. ioo, 18 Sup. Ct 526. The
reasoning of the Keating case seems sufficient to distinguish Ex parte Wisner,
and in view of the criticism which that case has received and the confusion it
has caused, the courts would seem justified in limiting its doctrine as narrowly
as possible. It is to be hoped that Congress or the Supreme Court will shortly
clear up the uncertainty in which the whole subject is involved.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs-ORAL CONTRACT TO DEvsE-EFFECT OF PART PEzrORM-
ANcE.-The plaintiff and her stepfather in 1865 entered into an oral agree-
ment with the intestate, whereby the latter agreed to adopt the plaintiff
and to make her sole heir, in consideration of having the control and custody
of her and obtaining her obedience and services as a daughter. The plaintiff
fully performed, though she was never legally adopted, and no will was made.
Prior to 19o5 in California an agreement of this character was not required to
be written. Held, that the plaintiff was the equitable owner of all the property
left by the intestate. Sieinberger v. Young (I917 Cal.) 165 Pac. 432.
The deceased in consideration of the plaintiff's care and affection orally agreed
to devise and bequeath to her the bulk of his estate. He died intestate, leaving
an estate of which about one-half was realty. Held, that the contract, though
not within the statute of frauds as an agreement not to be performed within
a year, was within the statute as an agreement for sale of realty, since the
deceased might have performed by devising real estate; that the doctrine of
part performance had no application, this being an action at law, and that
recovery could be had only in a quasi-contractual action for the value of the
services rendered; also, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
against such quasi-contractual action until the death of the deceased. Quirk v.
Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. (1917, C. C. A. 6th) 244 Fed. 682.
The validity of contracts to bequeath or devise is discussed above in Com-
MENTS, p. 542. As to the effect of the statute of frauds, Steinberger v. Young
follows the former California rule, which was changed by statute in i9o5.
Roger v. Schlotterback (1914) 167 Cal. 35, 138 Pac. 728; see, 18 COLUmBIA L.
REV. 95. The federal case is in accord with the more usual rule that the statute
of frauds applies to a contract of this nature where part of the promisor's estate
consists of realty. Some courts hold, however, that the equitable doctrine of
part performance is applicable and is sufficient to take the case out of the statute
where the promisee, relying upon a promise of payment by will, has rendered
services of a special character or has otherwise performed in such a manner
as to make it inequitable not to enforce the contract. Svanburg v. Fosseen
(899) 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4; Teske v. Dittberner (1903) 7o Neb. 544, 98
N. W. 57. This is opposed to the better reasoned rule stated in the leading
English case, that part performance is sufficient only when the acts relied on
are such as unequivocally point to the existence of a contract for the conveyance
of real estate, such as the entering into possession thereof, and hence that the
rendering of services does not constitute part performance sufficient to take the
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case out of the statute. Maddisoz v. Alderson (1883, H. of L.) L. R. 8 App.
Cas. 467; Grant v. Grant (1893) 63 Conn. 530, 29 Atl. 15; Grindling vt. Reyht
(19o7) 149 Mich. 641, II3 N. W. 29o, I5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, with note. In
the absence of an express agreement to pay by will, recovery on a quantum ineruit
for services is limited by the statute of limitations to the services rendered within
six years preceding the bringing of suit. Hoskins v. Saunders (i9o7) 8o Conn. ig,
66 Ati. 785. It seems clearly correct, however, to hold that since an express agree-
ment to pay by will, even though unenforcible because of the statute of frauds,
would have prevented any recovery upon a quantum meruit during the lifetime
of the decedent, the statute of limitations does not in that case begin to run
until death, and recovery may be had upon a quantum meruit for the whole value
of the services rendered or support furnished. Schempp v. Beardsley (191o)
83 Conn. 34, 75 Atl. 14I; Hull v. Thorns (i9io) 82 Conn. 647, y4 Atl. 925. But
see Banks v. Howard (19o2) 117 Ga. 94, 97, 43 S. E. 438, 439.
TAxATION-FEDERAL INcOME TAx-STocK DIvxEN.-The plaintiff, as a
stockholder in a corporation, received a stock dividend representing his share
of $,5oooo of undistributed profits earned by the corporation before January I,
1913, and transferred, at the time of making such stock dividend, from surplus
to capital account. Being compelled by the Collector of Internal Revenue to
pay an income tax on the stock so received as equivalent to its par value in cash
income, he sued the Collector to recover the amount so paid. Held, that under
the Income Tax Law of October 3, 1913, such stock dividend was capital and
not income, since the plaintiff's old and new stock taken together merely
represented the same proportional interest in the same corporate assets which
his old stock had previously represented. Towne v. Eisner (I918) 38 Sup. Ct.
158. See COMMENTS, p. 553.
ToRTs-LABoR UNIONs-BoycoTT OF MATERuALs MAD IN NoN-UNION SHOP.-
The plaintiff, who employed non-union men in his factory, sought an injunction
to restrain the officers and agents of a carpenters' union from: (I) taking steps
to compel the members to observe the rules of the union prohibiting them from
working on materials made in non-union shops; (2) sending circulars to the
plaintiff's prospective customers requesting them in making contracts to provide
for the employment of union men and the use of union-made materials exclu-
sively, with -the suggestion that in this way labor troubles would be avoided;
(3) inducing workmen in other trades to quit work on any building because
non-union medi were there employed in installing materials coming from non-
union shops. Held, that these acts were lawful and that the complaint should
be dismissed. Bossert v. Dhuy (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 582. See COMMENTS,
P. 539.
TORTS-PRoPERTY ACcIDENTALLY CAST ON LAND OF ANOTHER-UNNEcEs-
SARY DAMAGE IN REuovAL.-The plaintiff's boats were carried away by a violent
storm and left on the defendant's railroad tracks. The evidence showed that
the defendant company had plenty of time to remove them itself without
damage, or to permit the plaintiff to do so. Instead, the defendant's wrecking
crew broke or sawed them up and burned them. Held, that the defendant was
liable for the value of the boats. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. $oullian (1917,
Miss.) 76 So. 769.
This decision is in accord with the weight of authority to the effect that an
owner of land may remove chattels accidentally cast on his land provided he
uses due care in doing so, but may not needlessly injure or destroy them, or
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subject their owner to unnecessary expense in recovering them. Berry v. Carle
(1825) 3 Me. 269; McKeesport Sawmill Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (i9o3, C. C.
W. D. Pa.) 122 Fed. 184. Still less may he convert them to his own use.
Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co. (1851) 16 Pa. 393. The dictum in the case last
cited that, after one on whose land property belonging to another is cast by a
flood has notified the owner to remove the property, and the latter has neglected
to do so, the former may rid himself of the incumbrance by casting it into the
river, goes further than the authorities generally would seem to warrant. Even
where chattels are found on another's land under circumstances furnishing
much less excuse for their presence, the owner of the land is still bound to
use such care in removing them as is consistent with the reasonable protection
of his own interests. Cf. Mead v. Pollock (igoo) 99 Ill. App. 151; Postal Tele-
graph-Cable Co. v. Gulf & S. I. R. R. Co. (1915) 11O Miss. 770, 70 So. 833.
A railroad company would often be justified in taking more summary measures
than an ordinary land owner, because of its duties to the public and the serious
risks to which it is exposed by an obstruction on its tracks; and it has been
said that the interests of the party menaced should be the first consideration;
but, as pointed out in the same case, he should take such steps only as are
reasonably necessary to free himself from danger, and the rule does not justify
a willful and unnecessary disregard of the other party's interests. McKeesport
v. Pennsylvania Co., supra. The principal case seems, therefore, a sound appli-
cation of established principles to a somewhat unusual situation.
"TREspAss-JusTIFicATIoN-Dn.EcTIoT OF COUNTY ENGINEER LOCATING TELE-
PiaoNE PoLEs.-The defendant telephone company placed its poles upon the
plaintiff's land, pursuant to directions of the county engineer, who by mistake
located them outside the line of the highway. A statute relating to the placing
of poles in public highways provided that "any new lines . . . shall be located
by the engineer" (see 1527-sI7, Iowa Supp. Code, 1913). Held, that the
defendant was not a trespasser. Briammer v. Iowa Telephone Co. (1917, Ia.)
165 N. W. 117.
The court asserts two reasons for its conclusion: first, that the engineer's
determination was, like decisions of quasi-judicial tribunals, not subject to
collateral attack, and, secondly, that the defendant's situation was analogous to
that of a military or administrative officer who is held immune from liability
for infringing private rights in obedience to an order issued by competent
authority. It is respectfully subiitted that neither of these reasons is adequate.
The statutory function of the engineer is to locate poles within the highway.
His order as to property outside the highway is like a decision of a tribunal
acting, through an innocent mistake, beyond its jurisdiction. Such an order is
subject to collateral attack. Bradford v. Boozer (19o3) 139 Ala. 502, 36 So. 716.
If the statute be construed as giving the engineer authority to locate poles out-
side the highway, it is submitted that it would be unconstitutional, as it provides
no hearing for a property owner whose land is thus taken, and no compensa-
tion. See Davis v. Commissioners (1896) 65 Minn. 31o, 67 N. W. 997; Branson
v. Gee (1894) 25 Oreg. 462, 36 Pac. 527. Since the engineer had no authority
to direct poles to be located outside the highway, the analogies relied upon by
the court are believed to be not in point. A sheriff executing a writ issued by
a court without jurisdiction is liable for trespass. Huddleston v. Spear (1848)
8 Ark. 4o6; cf. Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. Constantine (1894, C. C. A. 5th)
61 Fed. 61 (where, however, the highway commissioner acted within his juris-
diction, though erroneously). Likewise a military officer who seizes property
in obedience to orders which his superior was not authorized to give is liable
for the trespass. Bates v. Clark (1877) 95 U. S. 204; Little v. Barreine (i8o4,
U. S.) 2 Cranch 17o.
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WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-OBsTRUCTION BY NATURAL CAUsE-AcTION 
FOR
FAILURE TO REmovE.-A natural watercourse was obstructed at a point on the
defendant's land by falling trees and accumulated debris due to natural causes.
This obstruction, followed by heavy rains (not sufficiently unusual to 
constitute
an "act of God"), caused the stream to overflow the lands of the plaintiff, 
an
upper riparian owner. In an action for the resulting damage, the petition 
alleged
that the defendant, though notified of the obstruction, had failed and refused
to remove it, and had also refused the plaintiff's request for permission 
to
enter and remove it at his own expense. Held, that on these facts the plaintiff
was entitled to recover. Parrish v. Parrish (1917, Ga.) 94 S. E. 315.
Where the course of a natural stream is obstructed or altered by natural
causes, the change in conditions may of course be either sudden or gradual. 
In
the case of gradual changes it is almost a necessary result of the law of accre-
tion that none of the property owners affected may restore pre-existing conditions
without the consent of all others interested. This is especially obvious in cases
of slow lateral movement of the channel. Holcomb v. Blair (1903, Ct App.)
25 Ky. L. Rep. 974, 76 S. W. 843; but see contra, Gulf, etc., 
Ry. Co. v. Clark
(1goo, C. C. A. 8th) Ioi Fed. 678 and dictum in Johnk v. Union Pac. R. R. Co.
(igi6) 99 Neb. 763, 766; 157 N. W. gi8, gig. The same rule has been 
applied
to the accumulation of sand or gravel banks in the bed of the stream. Withers
v. Purchase (1889, Ch. D.) 6o L. T. N. S. 819; see also Rood v. Johnsoz (1853)
26 Vt. 64, 72. On the other hand, when there is a sudden change of channel,
authorities are apparently agreed that the owner on whose land the diversion
occurs may, if he so elects, restore the former conditions. Pierce v. Kinney
(1869, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 59 Barb. 56; Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown (gi) 
99
Miss. 88, 54 So. 8o4. The existence of a similar privilege in the case of obstruc-
tions appears never to have been questioned. The landowner must act, 
how-
ever, before new rights have become fixed in reliance on the permanence 
of the
new conditions. Woodbury v. Short (1845) 17 Vt 387; Morningstar v. Young
(186o) 2 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 294; cf. Johnk v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., supra.
The landowner has therefore the privilege in certain cases of restoring former
conditions, but no authority has been found which recognizes any duty on him
to do so, or any responsibility for the damage to his neighbor if he does not,
and there are strong dicta and at least one decision to the contrary. Price v.
Kinney, supra (gravel bank "chiefly produced by a flood"); see Jones v.
Turner (1866, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 46 Barb. 527, 534. On the remaining question
whether an upper or lower riparian owner may enter on the land where the
obstruction or diversion occurred, and do for himself what the owner of that
land is under no duty to do, the authorities are meagre and not wholly in
agreement See Wholey v. Caldwell (1895) 1o8 Cal. 95, 41 Pac. 31 (change of
channel-denied); Prescott v. Williams (1843, Mass.) 5 Met. 429 (accumulation
of debris-allowed). But the recognition in the principal case of such a right
on the plaintiff's part would not give him a cause of action for the mere refusal
of a permission which the law would supply. His remedy would have been
to exercise his privilege to enter and remove the obstruction, or if forcibly pre-
vented, to sue for such damages as proximately resulted from the prevention,
or seek an injunction against further interference, or both.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-"GooD SAMARITAN" AS EmPLOYEE.-The
driver of a coal cart, an employee of the defendant, being unable himself to
release his cart, which had been mired in the road-side mud, called upon the
plaintiff, a mere passerby, to assist him. While rendering the assistance thus
requested, the plaintiff received a serious injury. Held, that he was an employee
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of the defendant within the compensation act. State v. District Court (1917,
Minn.) 165 N. W. 268.
An essential element of the relation of master and servant is the submission
by the servant to the direction of the master. Labatt, Master and Servant, sec.
2. The relation is a contractual one, and to entitle one to the special benefits
arising out of it, both at common law and under the various compensation acts,
there must be a contract of employment, either express or implied. Atlantic,
etc., R. R. Co. v. West (19o5) 121 Ga. 641, 49 S. E. 711; Sibley v. State (igi5)
89 Conn. 682, 96 Atl. 161. Hence, one who is injured while assisting an
employee at his request is not compensated unless that employee had the appar-
ent authority to create that contractual relation on behalf of his employer.
Under ordinary circumstances, an employee has not this power. Flower v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1871) 69 Pa. St. 2IO; Mickelson v. New East Tintic Co.
(rgoo) 23 Utah, 4, 64 Pac. 463; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Stansberry (igio)
97 Miss. 831, 53 So. 389. In an emergency, however, when immediate action is
required in the employer's interest, and there is no fellow-employee present and
ready to assist, most tourts recognize such a power by implication. Central Trust
Co. of N. Y. v. Texas & St. L. Ry. Co. (1887, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 32 Fed. 448;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ginley (1897) ioo Tenn. 472, 45 S. W. 348; but see
Blair v. Grand Rapids R. R. Co. (1886) 6o Mich. 124, 26 N. W. 855. And in
such cases, the assistant may be a fellow servant, although he intends his ser-
vices to be temporary and gratuitous. Johnson v. Ashland Water Co. (1888)
71 Wis. 553, 37 N. W. 823; Aga v. Harbach (igo5) 127 Iowa 144, iOz N. W.
833. The decision in the principal case is, however, open to question, since it
does not appear in the report whether the assistant had submitted to the direc-
tions of the driver. Granting, however, that the relation of master and servant
did exist, recovery in the principal case was possible only because the Minnesota
statute, unlike many compensation acts, does not bar casual employees from its
operation, when the work in which they are engaged is in the usual course of
the employer's business. State v. District Court (1915) I31 Minn. 352, 155 N.
W. 103. See Thompson v. Twiss (Ig16) go Conn. 444, 449; 97 At. 328, 331.
Wm-s- vocAmrry-ErEcr OF CONTRACT To Dzvzs.-The probate court
admitted to probate as a will an instrument which was in form a deed, reciting
a present consideration and conveying all the property the grantor should own
at her death to her husband, with the proviso that "this is to take effect only
in case of my death prior to that of my husband." Following the state practice
permitting a person who has not contested a will in the probate court to do so
by bill in chancery, the beneficiaries under a will later in date brought their
bill to set aside the probate of the earlier instrument, a copy of which they
incorporated in their bill. Held, that a demurrer to the bill was good, since
the earlier will, being based upon a valuable consideration, was irrevocable; also
that a court of equity would not act to set aside the probate, since it would then
have to decree a trust in the husband's favor, and thus render its own action
nugatory. Walker v. Yarbrough (i917, Ala.) 76 So. 390.
See COMMENTS, p. 542.
WiTNEssEs-CompETENcy-FoRmER CONvIcTIoN OF FELONY.-Upon the trial, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, of two
defendants charged with conspiring to receive property stolen from "duly
authorized depositories of United States mail matter" in violation of a federal
statute, the prosecution offered the testimony of one Broder, who had formerly
been sentenced for forgery in a state court of New York and had served a term
therefor. This testimony was received over objection, and the defendants
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having been convicted, its admission was assigned as error. Held, that the
testimony of Broder was properly admitted. Vandevanter and McReynolds, JJ.
dissenting. Rosen v. United States (1918) 38 Sup. Ct 148.
At common law a witness was held incompetent to testify upon a showing that
he had ever been convicted and sentenced for a crime, even that of petty larceny.
Pendock v. Mackinder (i755, Eng. C. P.) Willes, 665. Official pardon, how-
ever, restored his civil rights in this particular as in others. Rex v. Celier
(168o, K. B.) T. Raym. 369; The King v. Reilly (787, K. B.) Leach, 5o9. In
1843, Lord Denman's Act was passed, growing out of a rising belief that valuable,
sometimes essential, evidence was stifled by this technical rule, and providing
that no person should thereafter be excluded from testifying because of a
previous conviction for crime. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85; 4 Chitty's Eng. St. (6th ed.)
531. This statute was the pattern for many later enacted in the United States
and the Dominion. See i Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 488. At the present time
the common law rule has been very generally abolished in the courts of the
States. See, however, Berry v. Godwin (1916, Tex. Civ. App.) 188 S. W. 3o.
In United States v. Reid (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 361, 366, it was held that the
competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the United States courts must be
determined by the laws in force in the respective states when the Judiciary Act
of 1789 was passed. No act of Congress has yet been passed to change this
rule, which has been followed by the federal courts in cases some of which are
of very recent date. See for example United States v. Gwynne (914, E. D. Pa.)
209 Fed. 993; United States v. Hughes (1892, D. C., W. D. Pa.) 175 Fed. 238.
See also Logan v. United States (1892) I44 U. S. 263, 298-303; 12 Sup. Ct 617,
628-63o. By the law of New York in 1789, which, under the rule of the Reid
case, would have governed in the principal case, one convicted of forgery was
disqualified as a witness. The court, however, declined to follow the Reid case,
holding that in view of the general change during the last century in the law
relative to the competency of witnesses, and the sound reasons on which this
change has proceeded, "the dead hand of the common law rule of I789' should
no longer govern the determination of such questions. This decision finds some
support in a previous case by which the authority of the Reid case was some-
what shaken, though it was by no means overruled. See Benson v. United States
(1892) 146 U. S. 325, 3 Sup. Ct 6o. The result is commendable, but it may be
doubted whether the court did not encroach somewhat on the legislative field
in accomplishing it.
